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Abstract
U.S.-Pak relation is the typical example of the interactions 
between the global conflict and the regional conflict. The 
United States value Pakistan most is the contribution to 
the containment communism and counter terrorism. And 
Pakistan’s ultimate demand in the U.S. is to enhance the 
ability to resist India. The United States is much stronger 
and richer than Pakistan. The national interests of the 
two countries are often conflicting. All these result in the 
U.S.-Pak relation has many characteristics. The study 
of these characteristics is very helpful to understand the 
relationship between the two countries.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S.-Pak relation is the typical example of the interactions 
between the global conflict and the regional conflict. 
The United States value Pakistan most is the value of 
global level, in another word is the contribution to the 
containment of communism and terrorism. And Pakistani 
ultimate demand in the U.S. is the value of regional level, 
in another words are enhancing the ability to resist India. 
Domestic factors in both the United States and Pakistan 
also played an important role in the relationship between 
the two countries. The United States and Pakistan 
respectively attach importance to different level. The two 
countries have their specific situations. And there are huge 
differences between the two countries. All these results 
in the U.S.-Pak relation have many characteristics, which 
are significant in the following three points: inequity, 
instability, cognitive difference.
1.  INEQUALITY
There is huge inequity in U.S.-Pak relation. As a 
superpower, the United States has a strong comprehensive 
national strength. So, U.S. had the leading position in 
the U.S.-Pak relation. And Pakistan was just a medium-
sized developing country in south Asia. In many 
strength indexes, such as territory, population, economic 
strength, military strength and technological strength 
and etc, Pakistan was far behind the United States. Thus, 
Pakistan had a relatively weak position in the U.S.-Pak 
relation. Although Pakistan could rely on some favorable 
conditions to start the game with U.S., but find it is 
difficult to exceed the United States policy boundary.
In 1982 December, the Pakistani leader, general Zia 
ul Haq told Secretary of State Schultz, the United States 
and Pakistan established is an unequal alliance. (Dennis, 
2001, p.361) Zia ul Haq’s Conclusion generally aligns 
with the facts. Moreover, the U.S.-Pak relation not only 
the aligned period had the characteristics of inequality, but 
also in other periods was too.
The United States was a superpower, which had 
globally interests. And U.S. had the most developed 
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economy and the most powerful military force. For the 
United States, although Pakistan was a populous Islamic 
country, but Pakistan was located in South Asia. In many 
national strength indexes, Pakistan was a medium-sized 
country, and the economy was very backward. Therefore, 
U.S. did not put Pakistan in a particularly important 
position. While in Pakistan, the United States had the 
extremely important position. Cause the United States was 
the most powerful country in this world. As a superpower, 
U.S. had the comprehensive national strength, could 
provide great help for Pakistan in the national defense, 
diplomatic and economic fields. Today, Pakistanis are still 
popular with a tease, but correct parlance that the fate of 
Pakistan is determined by 3 A: Allah, Army and America. 
The ordinary Pakistanis put the U.S. on equal height to 
Allah and the most powerful military. The importance 
of U.S. to Pakistanis was very obvious. Indeed for the 
Pakistani, U.S. was very important. The extent was 
much more than Pakistan’s importance to the Americans. 
Although the U.S.-Pak relation often encountered 
difficulties, but Pakistan still hoped to establish and 
maintained good relations with the United States.
The degree of Pakistan cares the United States far 
more than the United States cares about Pakistan. So the 
United States was the side of higher status, and Pakistan 
was the side of the lower status. The attention degree 
of the Pakistan for U.S. is much higher than U.S. for 
Pakistan. In fact, apart from the period of the Afghanistan 
war in 1980’s and 2000’s, Pakistan rarely became the 
priority object of American diplomatic.
In international relations, the frequent degree of 
exchange visits between the leaders could be used as 
an indicator, to observe the two countries attach how 
many importances to each other. U.S. presidents only 
visited Pakistan for three times. And only two visits 
are the official state visits, and one visit is just a short 
stay. President Eisenhower in 1959 and President Nixon 
in 1969 are the official state visit. In 1967, President 
Johnson’s special plane just landed at Karachi Airport. 
(Dennis, 2001, pp.361-362) In contrast to this, only 
Pakistan leaders’ official visits or state visits to the United 
States are 10 times, 5 times to the corresponding figures 
of U.S. leaders’ visits to Pakistan. The leaders who had 
state visit or official visit to U.S. are prime minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan (1950), Prime Minister Muhammad 
Ali Bogra (1954), prime minister Huseyn Shaheed 
Suhraswardy (1957), President Muhammad Ayub Khan 
(1961 and 1965), Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
(1973 and 1975), President Muhammad Zia ul Haq 
(1982) and Premier Muhammad Khan Junejo (1986) and 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1989). (Dennis, 2001, 
p.430)
In the history of U.S.-Pak relation, the United States 
was always in the superior side, so the United States 
lacked the necessary understanding of Pakistan, did not 
considerate for Pakistani interests. In the view of many 
American High-ranking officials, Pakistan was not the 
United States equal partners, in fact it is a draughtsman 
controlled by U.S. in the big game of international 
relations. In order to realize its national interests, the 
United States was willing to damage the national interests 
of Pakistan.
The United States believed that Pakistan was heavily 
dependent on American aid, and Pakistan also lacked 
of effective means to restrict America, so despite U.S. 
aware that Pakistan strongly disliked the rise of US-Indo 
relation, U.S. chose to ignore the feeling of Pakistan, 
tried its best to woo India. The U.S. concluded that, 
even if Pakistan dissatisfied the practice of the United 
States, but because too dependent on American aid, 
so the United States could easily repair the damaged 
relationship. After the 1962 Sino-Indo border conflict, 
the United States violated its commitments to Pakistan, 
did not negotiate with Pakistan, then decided alone to 
provide military assistance to India. National Security 
Council member Komer told President Kennedy in the 
memorandum, Pakistan was too dependent on American 
aid, so would not make too radical reaction to the U.S. 
aid to India. Komer pointed out: “I am convinced that 
Pakistan knows it gets too much benefit from the United 
States. If cut the ties with the United States, Pakistan 
would suffer heavy losses.” (Smith, 1996, p.375) In 
fact, Pakistan felt extremely offensive for U.S. aid to 
India. The American ambassador to Pakistan Walter P. 
McConaughy believed that President Ayub Khan had 
never forgiven President Kennedy. Cause President 
Kennedy did not comply with the commitment which 
before make decision to provide military assistance to 
India, U.S. would negotiate with Pakistan. Ayub Khan is 
a Pashtun, extreme regard personal commitment. To Ayub 
Khan, this is a very serious offense. (Dennis, 2001, p.131)
Except U.S. disregard the feeling of Pakistan to U.S.-
Indo relation, also frequently used aid as threatening 
weapon to Pakistan. In August 12, 1963, President 
Kennedy called Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Deputy 
Secretary of state George Ball and others to discuss the 
U.S.-Pak relation. Kennedy is openly pointed out: “Ayub 
Khan wants us to put pressure on India to resolve the 
Kashmir issue. But we could not meet his requirements. 
Cause we could not get much benefit from Pakistan. For 
us, only the Pakistan based intelligence facilities have 
value.” President Kennedy has proposed to George Ball, 
who had a upcoming visit to Pakistan:
We’d better remind Pakistani: We don’t like communist China. 
We have to stop Pakistan from the anti American newspaper 
publicity which would lead to serious consequences, and 
tells  the Pakistani: Peshawar’s intelligence facilities are very 
important to us. If Pakistan didn’t do what we want, we would 
stop providing assistance to Pakistan. (Smith, 1996, pp.635-639) 
So, George Ball told Pakistani: “We very much hope 
President Ayub will not carry relations with Red China to 
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a point where it impairs a relationship which we have.” 
(Rashmi, 2007, p.48)
2.  INSTABILITY
The U.S.-Pak relation had great instability. The U.S.-Pak 
relation in the mid 1950’s to the early 1960’s was very 
friendly, but was in a very weak status in 1962 to 1968. 
Despite the U.S.-Pak relation from 1969 to 1976 had a 
little improvement, but could not resume the harmonious 
state. From 1977 to 1980, is another cold winter of the 
U.S.-Pak relation. From 1981 to 1989, is the second warm 
spring of the U.S.-Pak relation. From 1990 to 2001, the 
U.S.-Pak relation was fall into the trough. The U.S.-Pak 
relation has seen periodic rise and fall, causing U.S.-Pak 
relation was in a very unstable state.
In August 14, 1947, Pakistan was established. In 
the same year, U.S. announced the Truman doctrine, 
the cold war began. U.S. became the leader of the anti 
Communism camp. At that time, the goal of U.S. in the 
South Asia is India, not Pakistan. Cause India had large 
population, vast territory and rich international influence. 
So, U.S. did not pay much attention to Pakistan.
However, India insisted its neutralism foreign policy; 
did not want to join the Western camp. At this time, U.S. 
found that Pakistan has a very superior strategic value, 
so U.S. began to view Pakistan as potential partner 
which could contain the Soviet Union’s expansion in 
the south direction towards the Middle East. In order 
to obtain the support of U.S. to fight against the India, 
Pakistan was willing to join the U.S. led containment 
system. Therefore, U.S. and Pakistan formed military 
alliance in 1954 in their different motives. However, 
with the change of international situation, some 
problems emerged and stroked the U.S.-Pak relation. 
Then the U.S.-Pak relation gradually cooled down under 
President Kennedy and President Johnson ruling period. 
Finally in 1965, when the second Indo-Pak war burst, 
the U.S.-Pak relation fell to a low point. Although the 
U.S.-Pak relation had improved under President Nixon 
and President Ford’s reign, but fell into the abyss under 
Carter ruling period due to a series of problems such as 
the nuclear issue. In the 1980’s, President Reagan and 
President Bush’s ruling period, U.S. and Pakistan joined 
together to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
This was a booster for the U.S.-Pak relation, but after 
the Soviet Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan persisted on nuclear development, the U.S.-Pak 
relation once again fell into the abyss.
The reason why the U.S.-Pak relation encountered 
so many ups and downs is the national interests and 
national security policy of U.S. and Pakistan often had 
serious conflict. At a glance, under President Eisenhower, 
President Nixon and President Reagan ruling period, 
the national interests and national security policy of 
U.S. and Pakistan were consistent. However, under 
President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Carter 
and President Bush ruling period, the national interests 
and national security policy of U.S. and Pakistan had 
great differences. (Dennis Kux, 2001, p.360) Because the 
security objectives of U.S. and Pakistan did not have long-
term overlap, so the U.S.-Pak relation lacked of a solid 
common national interests basis, it was difficult to avoid 
serious differences and frequent disputes. So, the U.S.-Pak 
relation appeared unstable state.
The core of Pakistan’s foreign policy was guarded 
against India, and contest with India for the Kashmir. 
Pakistan always paid too much attention to India. This 
made Pakistan often take some policies which made U.S. 
felt very dissatisfied. This induced the damage of the U.S.-
Pak relation. First of all, Pakistan improved relations with 
China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960’s. When 
Pakistan changed the course of her foreign policy, the 
United States resented the move. (Chaudhri, 1970, p.52) 
Cause its ally Pakistan unexpectedly established intimate 
relation with China. And China was a rival of America. 
Then, Pakistan makes war with India for Kashmir in 1965.
s Pakistan used the U.S. arms in this war. This made U.S. 
felt very confused. After this war, the U.S.-Pak relation 
fell into the trough.
Finally, in order to balance national strength and 
military advantage of India’, to defend national interests, 
Pakistan started  secret nuclear program in the mid 1960’s, 
then restart and promote the nuclear program in 1990, 
which led to many  blocks of the U.S.-Pak relation during 
President Ford, President Carter and President Bush 
ruling period. For U.S., even the U.S.-Indo relation often 
alienated, but never regards India as the enemy. Nixon and 
Kissinger claimed that vigorous American action deterred 
India from dismembering West Pakistan.(Venkataramani, 
1984, pp.397-398) In fact, except President Nixon deter 
India from invade and annex western Pakistan territory in 
the third Indo-Pak war, U.S. would never stand in Pakistan 
against India. (Dennis, 2001, pp.360-361)
The core of American foreign policy was cold war and 
counter terrorism. Before President Nixon took office, 
China was a long term target of the containment. America 
wanted Pakistan to help containing the Soviet Union and 
China. When Pakistan met American expectation to play 
an active role of the ally, the U.S.-Pak relation would be 
more smoothly. When Pakistan sought its own national 
interests, contrary to American willingness to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union and China, the U.S.-Pak 
relation would encounter difficulties. In addition, America 
made great efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Because Pakistan refused to bow to American 
pressure, adhere to the nuclear development, the U.S.-Pak 
relation encountered many difficulties. The instability of 
the U.S.-Pak relation reflected the reality that the national 
interests of Pakistan and America sometimes overlapped, 
sometimes clashed.
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3.  THE COGNITIVE DIFFERENCE
U.S. and Pakistan had serious cognitive differences. 
Cognitive differences originated from two countries 
focused on different aspects. While the U.S. focus was 
worldwide, Pakistan’s primary focus remained regional. 
(Kheli, 1982, p.151) U.S. attached great importance to the 
global conflict, such as the cold war and anti terrorism, 
could not understand the Pakistani dread against India, 
and also questioned the authenticity of Pakistani fear 
against India. Pakistan attached importance to the regional 
conflict with India, and was difficult to follow U.S. to 
contain the Soviet Union and China, and began to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union and China from the early 
1960’s. Cognitive differences between the two countries 
were also reflected in the orientation of the nuclear issue.
American formed an alliance with Pakistan based on 
global conflict considerations; the main intention was to 
improve the containment system and counter terrorism 
system. U.S. only viewed Pakistan as a small partner. 
As for the disputes between Pakistan and India, U.S. 
could know Pakistani concerns about India, but could not 
understand the feelings of Pakistan. U.S. believed that 
Pakistani concerns about India were overblown. Cause 
India did not want to take the initiative to invade Pakistan. 
President Kennedy had expressed this idea. In August 
12, 1963, President Kennedy met with Secretary of state 
Dean Rusk and Deputy Secretary of state George Ball 
and other officials to discuss the problems the of U.S.-
Pak relation. During the meeting, President Kennedy 
admitted that he totally didn’t agree with Pakistani 
views about India: “Pakistan was not worried about the 
threat from India, but worried about the loss of ability 
to contend with India. India would not take the initiative 
to attack Pakistan, because it will cost a billion dollars 
in military expenditure.” (Smith, 1996, pp.635-639) 
President Kennedy’s statement had been challenged in the 
third Indo-Pak war. Because India had taken initiative to 
invade East Pakistan, did not want to lose the opportunity 
of dismember Pakistan even it would consume a large 
number of military expenditure.
Pakistan formed an alliance with U.S. based on the 
consideration of the regional conflicts; the main intention 
was to get the U.S. military and economic aid, to balance 
the advantages of India and protect national security. The 
former foreign minister and Prime Minister Muhammad 
Ali Bogra pointed out: “Our only objective is to defend 
the stability and security of Pakistan. Therefore, we 
need to get supports of like-minded and peace-loving 
countries. We never hide the fact that India is the number 
one threat of Pakistan.” (Sayeed, 1961, p.232) For the 
global conflict, Pakistan could not spare any effort to 
support U.S. without reservation. During the Bandung 
Conference in 1955, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali 
Bogra held two meetings with  Premier Zhou Enlai. Prime 
Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra told the Premier Zhou 
Enlai: The aim of Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization was not to against China, was only 
to prevent from the invasion of India. Pakistan would 
not participate in the U.S. led war towards China. Zhou 
Enlai was no doubt greatly impressed by Pakistani Prime 
Minister Muhammad Ali’s straightforwardness. (Sherwani, 
1980, p.66) China accepted the interpretation of Pakistan. 
A few days later, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out at a 
press conference that China had already reached a mutual 
understanding with Pakistan. Prime Minister Muhammad 
Ali Bogra was confirmed on the spot.  (Garver, 2001, 
p.191)
U.S. and Pakistan had extremely cognitive differences 
on Pakistan nuclear development problems. U.S. viewed 
Pakistani nuclear development as the problem of global 
level; believed that Pakistani nuclear issue related to the 
global non-proliferation efforts, it was not a problem 
of Pakistan itself or regional issues in South Asia. For 
example, in the beginning of 1976, the Ford administration 
strengthened the export control of sensitive products to 
some countries including Pakistan. These countries had 
not signed the “nuclear nonproliferation treaty”, and did 
not permit the international community to examine all 
of their nuclear facilities. In August 1976, Secretary of 
state Kissinger visited Pakistan, tried to persuade Pakistan 
to stop its nuclear development. Kissinger pointed out 
to Ali Bhutto: the Democratic Party was likely to win 
the presidential election. Democrats would take more 
stringent measures on nuclear proliferation, and are likely 
to punish Pakistani nuclear development, to deter other 
country like Pakistan. (Dennis, 2001, pp.221-222)
And Pakistan viewed nuclear issue as a matter of 
national survival; the aim was to deter India. Therefore, 
Pakistan viewed nuclear development as a problem in 
South Asia, rather than the global level problem. For 
example, in 1979, U.S. insisted on sanctions to Pakistan 
on nuclear development. (Thornton, 1982, p.967) Pakistan 
was very angry. What Made Pakistan felt most uneven 
is that U.S. did not punish India, and India had really 
exploded a nuclear device. Just like a Pakistani senior 
official said: “If U.S. had impose sanctions on India, we 
won’t be so mind. We could understand American favor 
Israel. It is a special case. But we could not understand, 
since U.S. refused to sanction India, why U.S. pressed 
Pakistan so severely.” (Dennis, 2001, p.239) Similarly, 
in 1990, U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan. What made 
Pakistan felt angry was that U.S. imposed sanctions 
against Pakistan, but did not impose sanctions on India. 
And India itself was the country which had exploded a 
nuclear device in 1974. (Dennis, 2001, p.310)
In fact, the cognitive differences of Pakistan and U.S. 
on the nuclear issue highlights the U.S. and Pakistan were 
in different status and situation. From the perspective of 
international status, U.S. was a global superpower, mainly 
focused on global issues, thought a problem mainly 
focused on the global level, lacked the understanding 
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of regional problem. Pakistan is a medium country 
in South Asia, mainly focused on regional problems, 
thought a problem mainly focused on the regional level, 
lacked of awareness of consider problem from a global 
perspective. From the perspective of the situation, 
U.S. was the inventor of nuclear weapons, also had 
many nuclear weapons than most of countries, did not 
hope that more countries to hold nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, U.S. viewed Pakistani nuclear issue was a 
kind of issue whether compliance with international 
rules. But Pakistan was a country which always worried 
about India annexation. Pakistan engaged in nuclear 
development was to defend the national survival, the 
main objective is to balance Indian absolute superiority 
of the national strength and the military force. After 
India had a nuclear test in 1974, Indian advantages 
over Pakistan expanded further. Pakistani fears about 
India deepened further, more unlikely to stop its nuclear 
development. Therefore, the views of U.S. and Pakistan 
on nuclear development were totally different. As for 
Pakistani view, nuclear development issue was a life-
and-death problem.
CONCLUSION
After the foundation of Pakistan, U.S.-Pak relation 
encountered many ups and downs. Since the Soviet Union 
collapsed, containing the Soviet Union, the global factor 
which had long dominated the U.S.-Pak relation did not 
exist. But the nuclear issue and Kashmir issue which had 
influenced the U.S.-Pak relation in the past were continue 
to exist, and flared up in the late 1990’s in a more radical 
form. Moreover, the problem of terrorism derived from 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to some extent became 
the focus of global attention at the beginning of the 21st 
century, and it influencing the U.S.-Pak relation today. 
Although the U.S.-Pak relation had experienced many 
changes after the cold war, but the structural factors 
of U.S.-Pak relation did not change. Therefore, the 
characteristics of U.S.-Pak relation continue to exist in 
this period, and would not have too much change in the 
foreseeable future.
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